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Book Review 
Jeffrey Hanson and Michael R. Kelly, eds., Michel 
Henry: The Affects of Thought (London: Continuum, 
2012), 177 pp.  
Michel Henry (1922-2002) was a leading philosopher in France during 
the second half of the twentieth century.  His literary productivity, which 
included the publication of four novels, extended from the 1940s until his 
death in 2002.  The study of Henry’s place in French philosophy in this 
period is only at its early stages, but his influence was undoubtedly 
significant.  The evidence suggests that many at least knew something of his 
work.  His defense took place in February 1963, with a jury comprised of 
Jean Wahl, Jean Hyppolite, Paul Ricoeur, Ferdinand Alquié, and Henri 
Gouhier, all significant figures from an earlier generation of philosophers.  
Another generation was in attendance too, among them Jacques Derrida, 
Gilles Deleuze, and Emmanuel Levinas.  After his defense, a young Derrida 
would send a letter to Henry, and later his first two pieces of writing.  
Cahiers Philosophiques records an interview of Henry on the subject of moral 
normativity, by a young Alain Badiou, then an assistant in philosophy in the 
faculty at Reims.  Henry and Foucault, both students of Hyppolite, once met 
by chance in Amsterdam, and would pass an amicable afternoon in 
conversation there.  Much later, in 1976, Levinas would make Henry’s The 
Essence of Manifestation the subject of his final course at the Sorbonne.  Less 
trivial indications also suggest that Henry’s reach was significant, though 
mostly inexplicit, and the themes that resonate throughout his work—
affectivity, immanence, subjectivity, life, etc.—have become important areas 
of study in their own right. 
The articles in this collection, edited by Jeffrey Hanson and Michael R. 
Kelly, serve to continue the work of initiating a still-nascent debate over the 
philosophical writings of Michel Henry in the Anglophone world.  The 
volume thus belongs to the early stages of Henry’s reception, and the 
contributions it contains will advance discussion around a number of 
important issues.  Gathered under the headings “Phenomenology,” 
“Christianity,” and “Theory and Practice,” the foci of this volume are limited 
to a selected set of questions and debates.  The articles are interpretive, 
critical, and comparative in nature.  Contributions by Jean-Luc Marion, 
Renauld Barbaras, and the editors situate Michel Henry’s philosophy within 
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the wider field of phenomenology.  Articles by Kevin Hart and Sylvain 
Camilleri indicate the radically different assessments that one can make of 
the theological import of Henry’s work.  Rolf Kühn and Raphaël Gély 
complete the volume by explaining and expounding the theoretical shifts 
initiated by Henry with respect to the question of truth, and with respect to 
social action.    
Jean-Luc Marion’s contribution to this volume reinforces and repeats 
Henry’s way of arriving at the invisible as the essence of phenomenality.  
Marion places Henry’s position in relief against the history of philosophy 
and shows what is so distinctive and important in Henry’s approach to the 
question of phenomenality; but Marion’s contribution also amounts to an 
original development of Henry’s position with respect to Marion’s own 
philosophical project.  He shows, first, how the history of metaphysics, as 
well as the history of phenomenology through Merleau-Ponty, has assumed 
the homogeneity of the visible and invisible, that is, the possibility of 
translating one into the other, or vice-versa.  Marion demonstrates, on the 
contrary, the vital significance of Henry’s decisive affirmation of the 
absolute distinction between visible and invisible, thus the impossibility in 
principle of arriving at the second by starting from the first.  Marion shows 
that the historical enterprise known as metaphysics can be seen as a 
theoretical failure to the extent that metaphysics does not and cannot admit 
this impossibility. Alternatively, the preeminence of Henry’s 
phenomenology stems from the way it grants phenomenality to the 
invisible, and at a more basic level, defines phenomenality as the invisible.  
The strength of phenomenology as a theoretical discipline consists in its 
power to articulate the invisible as such, bringing the invisible into the status 
of phenomenality, without supposing that this status borrows its privileges 
from the visible, whether as its ground, source, or destiny.  Marion also 
brings Henry’s 1963 text into dialogue with Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and 
the Invisible.  Marion’s remarks can be supplemented and extended by a 
consideration of Henry’s 2000 work, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, where 
Henry continues and clarifies why he does not follow Merleau-Ponty down 
the path of “turning the sensible into an absolute” (§ 21).    
For some readers, the contribution of Renaud Barbaras, who has written 
extensively on Merleau-Ponty, will offer a possible counterpoint to Marion’s 
reading.  Barbaras argues that Henry fails to show how immanence can lead 
to transcendence, that the connection and translation of the first into the 
second has not yet been achieved, and that the phenomenality of the body 
remains incomplete until this has been accomplished.  What for Henry and 
Marion must remain heterogeneous in principle, for Barbaras amounts 
rather to a first moment. Because the body and its movement are also 
worldly phenomena, for Barbaras, this fact must still be clarified 
phenomenologically:  “To refer [exteriority] to another regime of appearance 
is to avoid the problem, not to resolve it” (52).  Barbaras proposes instead to 
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substitute for what he calls Henry’s phenomenology of drive, a 
phenomenology of desire in which “Henry’s dualities shatter” on the surface 
of life’s “carnal movements” (53). “In desire,” Barbaras writes, “it is always 
the being of the self that is lacking; in desire, the subject is always separated 
from itself” (59).  For Barbaras, Henry cannot explain the relationship 
between life and the world simply because, for Henry, these two modalities 
are absolutely heterogeneous.  Thus, where Henry and Marion find a 
solution, Barbaras finds a problem.  The reader may find that Barbaras 
seems to force too much distance between himself and Henry in order to set 
up his position as an alternative.  For Henry, the body as such does form a 
unity between two modes of phenomenality; for him the point is that only 
one of these modes is original, while for Barbaras, the unity itself must be 
original as well.  Henry would agree, but would insist that this unity, as real, 
arises only in the light of life’s phenomenality, not in that of the world.    
Approaching this general problem of the relation of immanence and 
transcendence, but from a different perspective, the editors in their essay 
show, through Henry’s reading of The Idea of Phenomenology, why Henry’s 
notion of immanence is incompatible with that of Husserl.  They ask 
whether, “in the end, Henry is attempting to valorize the pre-reflective, to 
rehabilitate its fortunes in reaction to a perceived slight against it committed 
by reflection and the overvaluing thereof, or whether he is ultimately 
affirming the non-reflective” (77).  As Hanson and Kelly see it, if immanence 
does not exclude transcendence altogether, “if reflection is truly a function 
of life,” then the question remains in what way reflection “might shed a light 
of its own upon the dark region of its birth” (80).          
Kevin Hart, in this volume and elsewhere, has stated his desire for a 
more skeptical reception of the philosophy of Michel Henry.  Specifically, in 
his article “Inward Life,” Hart urges caution with respect to Henry’s 
approach to Christianity.  Not unlike Socrates’ accusers, Hart is worried that 
Henry may mislead “some younger philosophers and theologians” (88).  
Hart claims, furthermore, that Henry’s work is “a critique of received 
religion and a bold attempt to reconceive” and ultimately to “reformulate” 
Christianity (88, 94).  Hart also suggests that Henry’s The Essence of 
Manifestation “continues and extends Fichte’s project of affirming the 
primacy of ‘inward life’.”  Many will disagree with Hart’s characterization 
of Henry’s project, and it is certain that Henry did not understand his work 
in this way.  The main claims in Hart’s article probably pass with less 
argumentation than would be required to make the accusations stick, given 
the magnitude of the charges that he levels.  Hart’s particular way of 
blending theology and phenomenology will strike some readers as 
problematic, and this instinct may lead him to read Henry less charitably 
than readers might prefer. 
Nevertheless, Hart’s essay does put into relief at least one 
hermeneutical problem that arises when one seeks to interpret Henry’s 
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philosophy.  On whose terms does or should this interpretation rest?  For 
those inclined to read Henry on his own terms, Hart’s words of caution will 
seem helpful, but not convincing.  It will always be possible to argue, as 
many do, that Henry is selective in his reading of Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, 
or others.  But Henry’s choices of emphasis when commenting on his 
philosophical predecessors are not made out of a fidelity owed by right to 
the prevailing historical lines of interpretation or influence, or even by 
reference to what his philosophical predecessors themselves hold as their 
most salient insights.  Henry’s choices of emphases and principles of 
selection stem rather from what he regards as the most decisive and 
fundamental turns of argument in their work, even if these theoretical 
decisions passed largely unnoticed by those who made them.  From this 
point of view, Hart’s claim that Henry is selective, though perhaps a 
legitimate argument with respect to the history of philosophy or with 
respect to philology, will seem to many to be unconvincing as a criticism of 
Henry, who was nothing if not a close and incisive reader.          
A careful and compelling treatment of Henry’s relation to Christianity 
can be found in the contribution by Sylvain Camilleri, who argues that 
Henry’s last three books “introduce into the philosophical scene the first 
serious linking of phenomenology and soteriology” (111).  Camilleri’s 
exposition of this linking, which for him is still only latent in Henry, follows 
from his attentiveness to the distinctions between phenomenology and 
Christianity.  He shows in an effective way the key moments of Henry’s 
philosophical path as they pertain to the meaning of salvation, especially as 
it arises in the New Testament.  Camilleri’s important study makes a 
genuine contribution to our understanding of how the theology of salvation 
might bear upon our reading of Henry, and how the phenomenology of life 
might illuminate the doctrine of salvation in the Christian sense. 
In the final two essays, Rolf Kühn and Raphaël Gély show how Henry’s 
phenomenology challenges basic assumptions about the very idea of theory 
and practice, and about the relation between them.  Kühn’s contribution is 
primarily descriptive and aims to develop in his own terms Henry’s 
conception of truth as originary.  Gély’s essay, at once original and 
constructive, shows how the social dimension of human existence is not 
secondary or ancillary to the phenomenology of life, but is in fact essential to 
it.  His contribution is important as a corrective to more cursory readings of 
Henry, which see him as excessively concerned with human individuality.  
Gély also shows how the connections between individual and social might 
be reconceived on the basis of Henry’s work, and how the phenomenology 
of life also implies a phenomenology of social action.  Against Hegelian 
social theory, Gély argues that, when the “fundamentally affective 
dimension of a single shared life-force is denied, norms cannot be lived as 
anything other than pure instruments of regulative action… When the 
radically singular life of individuals is denied in the very immanence of its 
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felt-experience [pâtir], it is the very meaning of normativity that is deeply 
changed” (173).  For Gély, the foundations of normative practices are 
affective.  “The relationship between the normativity of common action and 
the self-realization of individual freedoms rests upon a more profound 
experience of norms, that of their implication in the growth of life’s affective 
participation in its own power” (ibid.).  The force of normativity does not 
consist in its status as objective, in the third person, but in the increase of 
life’s own force that life itself makes possible through it.  
Karl Hefty 
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